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2Context
• Expected long term benefits from Navy Open Architecture 
– Business benefits: 
• Flexible acquisition strategies and contracts that enable software 
reuse, easy systems upgrade, and shared data throughout the Navy 
– Technical benefits: 
• Modular open architectures facilitate system adaptation, portability, 
interoperability, upgrade-ability and long-term supportability
• The Achilles Heel - Test and Evaluation
– Current practices require retesting unchanged components after 
each system upgrade, typically every two years
– Substantial budget and schedule are currently devoted to retesting
– New technology, processes, and policies are needed to safely 
reduce this effort and free resources for testing new functionality
• Improvements sought by our research
– Less time for testing, quicker response to changes
– Improved reliability on larger scales without increasing testing cost
3Scientific Roadmap - Objectives
• Safely reduce testing cost
– Reduce the need for re-testing
– Eventually eliminate integration test after every reconfiguration
– Reduce cost of future system failures due to missed errors
• Make testing more effective by augmenting it with other quality 
assurance methods
– Develop conceptually new and different methods to achieve dependability in 
Navy OA systems in presence of reuse, reconfiguration, changes and 
unpredictable environments
• Enable Persistent Open Architectures
– The architecture should not have to change or be retested every time the 
system configuration changes
• Methods that cover many configurations with one analysis 
• Avoid redundant retesting of previously existing modules and architectures
4Scientific Roadmap - Approach
• Refine the open architecture concept to support system 
development and testing with interchangeable software parts 
that conform to persistent system standards
– Requirements that are stable across all configurations
– Both system-wide capabilities and subsystem/connection properties
• A Dependable Open Architecture should include:
– Not only components and connections but also constraints
expressing the most important dependability properties
– Links to requirements, capabilities and standards
– Variable parameters – KPP’s / features / Load characteristics
– Components and connectors should be swappable within 
compatibility groups defined by testable dependability properties
• Apply testing and systematic quality assurance at the 
architectural level as well as the system implementation level
5Long Term Solution Approach
• The proposed QA method is globally decomposed into five 
major steps:

















Standard for Component 1
Standard for Component 2
Standard for connection between 









Test Components vs. Standards
Verify Architecture vs. 





1 Formulate dependability contracts
5 Monitor environment assumptions
k 5
6 Monitor changes to executables
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6Short Term Problems
• Current Navy combat system test procedures require an 
integration test for every:
– System configuration (platform)
– Changed system configuration (upgrade)
• Open Architectures support frequent changes to configurations
– Retesting is expensive and time consuming
• Open Architectures support component reuse across platforms
– Component workloads subject to change
– New workloads expose new faults
7Recent Work - Approaches
• Reduce testing cost
– Methods to identify components that do not need to be retested
– Methods to limit scope of retesting when it is needed
– Methods to completely automate testing and analysis
• Maintain safety
– Program slicing to confirm unchanged behavior of unchanged code
– Automated testing to confirm unchanged behavior of modified code
– Operational profiles to efficiently test reusable components in 
different environments.
When Retesting a Service is Necessary
• When its slice or behavior has changed
• When requirements have changed
– New functionality needs to be tested
– Test all affected components
• When the range of expected operating conditions has expanded
– Even if there was no other change, new test scenarios are needed
– Indicated by a modified operational profile
• When computing speeds or timing constraints have changed
– Changed hardware processing rates can adversely affect 




• Program slicing is a kind of automated dependency analysis
– Same slice implies same behavior
– Can be computed for large programs
– Depends on the source code, language specific
• Slicing tools must handle arrays and objects correctly
– Need to certify the tools to be used
• Unchanged component behavior depends on continued 
correspondence of machine code to source code
• Must certify absence of memory corrupting bugs
– Tools exist: Valgrind, Insure++, Coverity,…
• Must ensure absence of runtime modifications due to cyber attacks
– Cannot be detected by testing because modifications are not present in test 
loads
– Need runtime checking, can be done using cryptographic signatures
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How Much Invariance Testing
is Enough?
• How many tests are needed to reach high confidence?
– Stakeholder defines the acceptable risk threshold k
• The expected frequency of behavioral differences in a given service is 
at most one in k missions.
• Number of test cases is computed for each service in the 
middleware interface to the operating system
– It is determined by the following formula
Ts = (k es) log2 (k es)
• Where s is a service, es is the mean number of executions of s per 
mission, k reflects stakeholder’s tolerance for risk as above
• Test cases are independently drawn from the probability 
distribution characterizing the mission, a.k.a. operational profile
– Statistical confidence level is 1 – 1/(k es)
• Probability of making a false positive conclusion matches the 
stakeholder’s risk tolerance
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Current Policy for Mishap Risk Assessment
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P: Probability of occurrence in the lifetime of an individual system, ranges taken from MIL_STD-882D
Testing Efforts vs. Acceptable Risk
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Ns = k es C Ts
103 .999 1.0 x 104
104 .9999 1.3 x 105
105 .99999 1.7 x 106
106 .999999 2.0 x 107
107 .9999999 2.3 x 108
108 .99999999 2.7 x 109
109 .999999999 3.0 x 1010
Number of test 
cases required for 
different levels of 
risk tolerance




















ing Testing cost 
characteristics
See paper in 2008 
acquisition conference 
for details
Why Do We Need Operational Profiles
• Can be used to automate selection of test cases
• Reliability of a system is determined by the operational profile
– Real systems have bugs, specification errors, requirement omissions, etc.
– System reliability varies from 0 (always fails) to 1 (never fails) in different environments
• Operational profiles have proved useful in practice
– Example: reliability testing of telephone-switching software
• It takes human effort to produce an operational profile
– Measure the frequency distributions of executions and associated input parameters for 
each service
• Can be collected on- or off- line
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Benefits of Operational Profiles
• Reduces testing resources
– Automatic generation of test cases
– Efficient selection of test cases
– Finds most frequent failures first
– Supports reuse of previous test results
• Good software reliability checking
– Statistically represents external environment
– Suited for software reuse testing
• Ideal for Open Architecture applications by 
enabling automated statistical testing
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Example of Using an Operational 
Profile for Reuse Testing
• Currently fielded software has been tested 
with N samples from operational profile g1(x) 
and functions reliably in that environment
• Software is being reused and placed in new 
environment represented by operational 
profile g2(x)
• What is the minimum amount of testing 
required to ensure operability and reliability in 
the new environment?
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Operational Profile for Two Different 
Environments
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Example of Using an Operational 
Profile for Reuse Testing (cont)
• Need additional testing in regions more likely 
in the new profile than in the old one
• The profile difference defines the needed test 
cases
– Pd(x) = if g2(x) > g1(x) then g2(x) – g1(x) else 0
– Must be scaled if reliability goals differ in the two 
environments





Example of Using an Operational 
Profile for Reuse Testing (cont)
• How to stress test the software?
– Safety or operationally critical software
– Extended boundary condition testing
– Checks for “unknown unknowns”, prevents 
surprises from the new environment






Methods for modeling operational 
profiles
• Identify all environment inputs and their 
dependencies
– Possible use of conditional distributions
• Estimate distribution for each input
– Mathematical analysis and use of histogram “bins”
when raw historical data is available
– Smoothing, interpolation & extrapolation to tails 
where raw data is missing
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Methods for modeling operational 
profiles (cont)
• Use of Bayesian methods for estimating 
distributions of actual data
• Implementing Stress Test profiles 
– When not enough information is known about 
current or past operational environments
– Always for safety critical software
• Calculate statistical confidence levels in the 




• Requirements analysis needs to span the entire problem 
domain and system life, not just individual versions of the 
System of Systems
– Same architecture must support all future versions and all platforms
– Planned control of variation via ranges for parameters/features
• Re-orient development processes toward Design-to-Tolerances
– Currently oriented towards Design-to-Fit, Test-to-Fit
• The architecture as a whole needs authority / priority
– Responsible organization 
– Global system standards authority
– Manage accountability for subsystems
– Empower via change control, acceptance testing, budget control, 
contracts with incremental commitment
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Acquisition Process Implications
• Domain requirements/Architecture development / QA need 
substantial time/resources/technology development
– Must be included in the plan from the start
– More detailed/precise standards and analysis needed
– Shift from current requirements to likely requirements trajectories
• New QA technologies needed
– Some known in labs but not used currently
– Tailoring/improvement may be needed for practical use
– Some areas need new methods to reach long term goals
– Will need tech transfer, training, and process changes for best 
practical impact
Short Term Recommendations
• Testing profiles and statistical test results should be attached to 
reusable components in repositories.
• Operational Profiles should be measured based on observed 
data.
• Validity of pointers and storage recycling should be checked by 
tools especially if components not retested based on slicing.
• Absence of code modification should be checked at runtime via 
cryptographic signatures.
• Automated invariance testing should be applied to components 
whose specifications are unchanged but hardware or code 
affecting behavior has changed.
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Short Term Recommendations (cont)
• Statistical testing should be performed for safety-
critical and mission critical functions.
• Need uniform guidance for mission-critical reliability, 
analogous to MIL-STD-882D for system safety.
• Effectiveness and safety of slicing criteria for avoiding 
retesting should be validated with a case study/demo.
• Reusable components should monitor assumptions 




• The slicing and automated testing approach has a 
potential to reduce testing duration and costs
– More research is recommended to substantiate the applicability of our 
approach to DoD systems
– Experimental evaluation of slicing  and invariance testing methods is 
needed
• Automated testing techniques can alleviate concerns 
about system risks due to technology innovations
• Measurement and analysis of the operational profiles 
of reusable components can be used to support 
analysis of changes in the operating environments
– Hence determining whether additional testing is necessary
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Backup Slides
Approach: Program Slicing [Weiser 84]
• What is a slice?
– A self-contained subset of a program
• Contains all of the code that affects its observable behavior 
– Determined by an observation point
• Example: behavior of a single service
– Contains only the relevant parts
• Why do slices matter?
– Behavior invariance property:
• If a service has the same slice in two different versions of a program, it 
has the same behavior in both versions
– If two slices are the same, the service does not have to be retested
– Slices can be computed on a large scale
• Involves dependency tracing, data flow analysis, and control flow 
analysis
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Invariance Testing Extends Program Slicing
• Used to check that behavior of modified code remains the same
– Candidates: Open Architectures and higher level middleware
• Enables effective slicing cutoff boundaries
– Example: operating system interface
– Example: upgrade from a deprecated interface
– Example: baseline specific interfaces used by common 
components
• Enhances slicing to identify more components that do not need 
retesting
• Relies on a statistical inference with a very high confidence level
– Needs large numbers of test cases
– Economically feasible because this kind of test and analysis can be 
completely automated
• Test cases - generate inputs by random sampling




• Navy systems are designed with open architecture in mind
– Hence encapsulating all system calls
• Program Slicing has been used in a wide variety of applications:
testing, debugging, program understanding, reverse 
engineering, software maintenance, change merging, software 
metrics.
– See paper for extended list of citations.
• Automate testing has been used to automatically generate open 
sets of test cases based on random samplings from 
implementations of operational profile distributions [Berzins and Chaki 
2002]
• Prior work on quality assurance for flexible systems at the level:
– Of requirements [Luqi, Zhang, Berzins & Qiao 2004] [Luqi & Lange 2006]
– Of architectures [Berzins & Luqi 2006] ][Luqi & Zhang 2006]
